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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to hear this
matter pursuant to Section 78-2(a)-3 of the Utah Code Annotated,
(1953, as amended) and pursuant to Rule 3 of the Rules of the
Utah Court of Appeals.
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from a judgment entered in the Fourth
District Court on April 6, 1988, by Judge Ballif.

The appeal

addresses only that part of the judgment rendered by Judge Ballif
involving the non termination of a Lease Option Agreement.

1

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
The appeal before this Court concerns a Option agreement
created by the parties along with a lease agreement on the same
property.

The Lease and the Option Contract are distinct and

separate agreements containing separate consideration and
restrictions. Judge Ballif found the Jensen's in default of the
lease, and thereby terminated the agreement.

However, Judge

Ballif did not terminate the Option finding it still viable
inasmuch as the Jensen's had maintained their part of the Option
Contract.

The issue raised by Petitioner questions whether Judge

Balliffs factual decision regarding the termination of the Lease
independent of the Option Contract creates an error of law.
DETERMINATIVE STATUTE
Petitioner references Utah Code Annotated, 1953
as amended, Section 78-36-1.

Respondent contends that this

statute's applicability is limited, in its determinative nature,
to the termination of the Lease and has no determinative effect
on the option.

Utah case law on contract interpretation and

enforceability, as well as doctrines of equity and good
conscience, will determine the status of the Option Contract
before this Court.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The Jensen's entered into a three year lease agreement
(dated March 20, 1985) for real property located at R.D. #1, Box

2

329-A, Provo, Utah 1 , (Addendum "A".) The Jensen's entered into an
Option Contract (dated April 1, 1985) whereby for a sum of $2,500
the Jensen's had the exclusive right and privilege of purchasing
the real property located at R.D. #1, Box 329-A, Provo, Utah for
a period of six months. (Addendum "B M , paragraph 3.)

This option

was renewable for a potential of five additional six month
periods provided $2,500 was paid for each period prior to the
expiration of the previous period.

(Addendum "B", paragraph 3.)

Both agreements are supported by individual covenants and
separate consideration. (See generally Addenda "A" and " B " ) .

The

lease agreement provided that in return for $462.47 per month
beginning on the first day of April, 1985, the Jensen's were
entitled to possession of the property in question for three
years. (Addendum "A".)

The responsibility for maintenance,

utilities, taxes, insurance, losses, presently existing
furnishings and fixtures, rental payments including late payments

^The legal land description is as follows: PARCEL 1:
Commencing 25.39 chains North and 7.63 chains West of the
Southeast corner of the Southwest corner of Section 34, township
6 south, Range 2 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian; thence South
102.8 feet; thence East 168.77 feet; thence 30x 20 ' west 38.74
feet; thence East 429 feet to the West line of the road; thence
North 39x 35 ' West 90 feet along said road; thence West 534 feet
to the place of beginning.
PARCEL 2: Commencing 25.39 chains North and 7.6 chains West and
South 102.8 feet of the Southeast corner of the Southwest Quarter
of Section 4, Township 6 South, Range 2 East, Salt Lake Base and
Meridian; thence East 168.777 feet; thence south 30x 20 ' East
488.02 feet; thence West 430.6 feet; thence North 421.20 feet to
the place of beginning.
Together with 1/2 share of the Lake bottom Irrigation Co., Water
Stock.
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were all openly addressed in the lease agreement.
On the other hand, the Option Contract provided that in
return for $2,500, the Jensen's were given the exclusive right
and privilege of purchasing the property in question for a period
of six months.

The Jensen's were required to make additional

payments of $2,500 in order to maintain this privilege. The
price, evidence of title, closing adjustments, and possession
requirements are all discussed per the written agreement.
(Addendum "B".)
The Lease Agreement refers to the Option Contract in that it
states that the lease period is three years unless it is
terminated by the lessee's purchase of the premises under the
Option Contract dated April 1, 1985. (Addendum "A".) The Option
Contract acknowledges an existing lease agreement between the
parties but does not express or imply any agreement that the
Option Contract was dependant upon any consideration other than
$2,500 payment as stated in the Contract itself. (Addendum "B",
paragraph 6.)

The Lease Agreement could be terminated by the

exercise of the Option but the Option was not subject to the
performance or termination of the Lease. (Addendem "C" and
Addendem "D", paragraph 8.)
The trial court found that the Jensen's had failed to
make payments as provided in the Lease Agreement and therefore
Petitioners were entitled to termination of the lease and the

^The Lease agreement and the Option Contract can be seen in
their entirety in the Addenda "A" and "B".
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receipt of all delinquent payments plus interest from May 12,
1987, to the present time. (Addendum "E", paragraphs 1, 2, and
3.)

The Trial court also found that the Option Contract was

still viable and that upon the Jensen's making all future
required payments pursuant to the Option Contract (and their
assumption of the loan from the Real Estate Contract dated June
30, 1978, between Neal as "Sellers" and Bess as "Buyers,") the
Jensen's were entitled to possession of the property and QuitClaim Deed from the Petitioner conveying all of their right,
title, and interest in the subject property and the Jensen's.
(Addendum "E", paragraph 8.)
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The question before this court is one of fact not law.

The

Lease and the Option Contract are distinct and separate
agreements containing separate consideration and restrictions.
The test to determine the independence of these contracts is
whether the express terms of the option are independent of the
covenants of the lease and whether the two contracts are
supported by valid consideration.

If so, then the option

continues in existence notwithstanding the lease's termination.
In compliance with this test a lease and an option can act
independently of each other despite references to one another.
Allowing the extinguishment of the Option Contract would create a
great windfall to the Petitioner, and a greater injustice to the
Jensen's pursuant to doctrines of reliance embodied in
Restatement (Second) Of Contracts Sections 87(2) and 90. The
5

Jensen's were found to have failed to meet the contingencies of
the lease and they have lost their rights accordingly; but in
equity and good conscience they have upheld the bargain under the
option and have reasonably relied on such. Consequently, the
intent of the parties will not be frustrated if the Petitioner
regains fair rental value of his property subject to the Jensen's
legal option to purchase.
ARGUMENT
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DECIDED THE HOLDER OF A LEASE AND
OPTION TO REAL PROPERTY DOES NOT AS A MATTER OF LAW LOSE BOTH
LEASE AND OPTION UPON THE DEFAULT OF THE LEASE.
The Lease and the Option Contract are distinct and separate
agreements containing separate considerations and restrictions.
The Appellant has advocated the notion that these two
separate agreements should be construed as a single contract.
For justification, the Appellant has relied upon three Court
cases which are all distinguishable from the present case.

In

Sacramento Baseball Club, Inc., v. Great Northern Baseball, Co.,
73 Utah Advanced Reports 10 (1987), the Utah Supreme Court had to
determine the enforceability of two simultaneously executed
contracts.
$100,000.

One was for the sale of a baseball franchise for
The second was for consultation services to be

provided by the seller for $88,000. The Court determined that
there was never any intention to provide consultation services
and that the second contract was a sham. The actual selling price
of the franchise was $188,000 and the parties created the phony
contract in order to enable the buyer and seller to manipulate
6

the tax treatment of the exchange.

So when the court said "[a]n

agreement may be a single contract even though it consists of
several writings that the parties have never physically attached
to each other," Id. at 11, they were referring to a situation in
which there are collateral documents that are unsupported by
distinct consideration.
case.

That is not the case in the present

As stated above, both contracts were independent and both

were supported by their own consideration.
Similarly, Land Reclamation, Inc. v. Riverside Corp., 261
Or. 180, 184, 492 P.2d 263, 265 (1972) is cited as holding that
the parties can use two written instruments, instead of one, to
effectually carry on their agreement.

In Land Reclamation a

buyer and seller entered into a contract to convey land.

The

contract required that the buyer use the land for a sanitary
landfill.

The warranty deed which was subsequently executed

contained no restrictions or conditions.

The Oregon Court

determined that the deed was only a vehicle for passing title to
the buyer according to the terms of the Contract, and not a
memoralization of the agreement.

Here again, the second document

which is being merged into the fist is without separate
consideration.

The consideration tendered for the deed is one

and the same as that declared in the contract.

Therefore, the

Court should treat the two documents as representing one
agreement.

This is not so in the present case because there were

two separate agreements: one for a lease, the other for an option
to buy and they each have separate and distinct consideration.
7

Completing his argument, the appellant cites Bledsoe v.
Hill, 747 P.2d 10 (Colo. App. 1987) as holding that if one
agreement is contained in more than one instrument, the documents
must be construed together to determine the intent of the
parties.

This is a true statement of law but it is not decisive

in this case for three reasons.

First, there is not one

agreement in the case at hand; there are two.

Second, even if

you construe the documents together, there is nothing in either
of them which indicates that the intent of the parties was to
make the contracts dependant upon each other.

The stated

exception is that the lease agreement would terminate if the
option was exercised, but that would occur as a matter of law as
the Jensen's possessory interest in the property would merge into
their ownership interest.

Finally, as stated in Bledsoe,

"questions of intent of the parties to a written instrument
implicate factual issues," !Id at 12. Factual issues are best
determined by the trier fact and in this case the trier of fact
has already concluded that the intent of the parties was to make
independent agreements.
By advocating the theory that these two separate agreements
should be construed as one contract, the Appellant hopes to place
the Jensen's in a situation similar to that of Russell v. Park
City, Utah, Corp., 548 P.2d 880 (Utah 1976).

In Russell, the

Supreme Court decided a case in which a right of first refusal
was contained in the same document as a lease contract.

The

Plaintiffs in Russell, terminated the lease agreement of the
8

Defendants due to Defendants failure to make timely rental
payments.

Defendants had made annual rental payments for the

first three years.

Late in the fourth year defendant and its

sublessee, Park West, were in dispute as to how much money Park
West actually owed Defendant.

The defendant then advised Park

West to make rental Payments directly to the plaintiff to offset
their debts to defendant.

Park West failed to make rental

payments to Plaintiff as directed by defendant.

Early in the

fifth year plaintiffs sent a letter to defendant's stating that
if rent was not paid within 45 days, they would terminate the
lease.

The defendants did not meet the deadline, but offered

payment approximately two weeks late.
and the lease was terminated.

Plaintiffs refused payment

Plaintiffs contended that the

right of purchase was intended as an integral part of the total
lease; and when the lease was breached the right to purchase also
was lost. The defendant argued that the first right of refusal
was an independent contract supported by separate consideration
($2,000) and independent of the lease for the entire ten year
term of the lease. The Utah Supreme Court affirmed the trial
courtf s decision to terminate the first right of refusal in
Russell.

The rule of law as stated by the Russell

Court is: "if

by the express terms of the option; it can be seen as independent
of the other covenants of the lease, and is supported by a valid
consideration; it can continue in existence notwithstanding the
lease's termination."

Russell at 891-92.

82 U. S. (15 Wall.) 471 (1872).

Citing Prout v. Roby,

The Russell Court did not apply
9

the general rule in favor of the lessee/optionee for three
reasons:

First, both agreements were contained in the same

document and there was an ambiguity within that document which
made the intent of the parties uncertain regarding the
relationship between the agreements.

Second, the trial court had

admitted extraneous evidence to clarify the ambiguity and had
determined that the intent was for the right of refusal to be an
integral part of the lease.

Third, the intent of the parties was

a question of fact and the Supreme Court of Utah affirmed the
trial court's decision as the trier of fact.
In the present case, there is no ambiguity in the contracts.
The ambiguity in Russell involved a statement in the option
portion of the contract which stated that "said right to purchase
to remain in existence during the entire term of the lease,
(emphasis added)

Therefore, there was a legitimate question as

to whether the option was intended to be dependant upon the
existence of the lease.

Here, there are two separate documents

with independent consideration.

The option terms are six month

increments and are not based upon the term, or the existence, of
the lease.

The trier of fact has determined that the intent of

the parties was to enter into two separate and independent
agreements.

According to the rule stated in Prout v. Roby as

cited in Russell, the option may be permitted to continue in
existence despite the termination of the lease.
According to the restatement (second) of contracts Section
87 (1981):
10

(1)

An offer is binding as an option contract if it:
(a) is in writing and signed by the
offeror, recites purported
consideration for the making of the
offer, and proposes an exchange of fair
terms within a reasonable time . . .

(2) An offer which the offeror should reasonably
expect to induce action or forbearance of a
substantial character on the part of the offeree
before acceptance and which does induce such action
or forbearance is binding as an option contract to
the extent necessary to avoid injustice.
Id.
The Option contract before the court is in harmony with all the
requirements of Section 87(1) and Section 87(1)(a).

In

conjunction with Section 87(2), Comment e. states that the
reliance must be "substantial as well as foreseeable".

The

Jensen's have done considerable work on the subject property in
contemplation of exercising their option including: putting in a
textured ceiling in the living and dining rooms, wallpapering the
living dining and bedrooms, painting the living, dining and
bedrooms, installing a rooftop swamp cooler and a refrigerator
upstairs, carpeting the upstairs and downstairs bedrooms and
living room, placing curtains in the living, dining and master
bedrooms, placing blinds in the bedroom, replacing the main water
line to the house, planting numerous large trees on the property,
replacing a wall in the shower, replacing the septic tank,
repairing the general plumbing and restringing the fence.
Through the aforementioned improvements, and others, the Jensen's
have developed equity in the property of approximately $30,000 in
the subject property which includes the six payments of $2,500
11

each according to the Option Contract which were accepted and
cashed by the Petitioners• Not only are these improvements and
equity substantial, they were foreseeable by Petitioner.
Allowing the extinguishment of the Option Contract would create a
windfall to the Petitioner, and an extreme injustice to the
Jensen's pursuant to doctrines of reliance embodied in
Restatement (Second) Of Contracts Sections 87 (2) and 90 (1981).3
The trial court's decision to maintain the Option Contract
conforms with the objective theory of contracts.

This common law

theory bases the assent to a contract not on the subjective
intention of the party, but on what a reasonable person would
have thought from the party's conduct.

From this approach the

Jensen's are well within the scope of a reasonable man standard
to believe that the two agreements, each capable of standing
alone, could be treated as such.

The allowance of the option is

not unconscionable because possession reverts back to the lessor
subject to the Jensen's option to buy.

This scenario is

identical to that in Russell, when the court stated, "after the
lease was terminated as delineated above, the plaintiffs were
free to rent the property to Park West or anyone else, as the
trial court correctly ruled." Id..

The Jensen's have failed to

meet the contingencies of the lease and they have lost their

^A promise which the promisor should reasonable expect to
induce action or forbearance on the part of the promisee or third
person and which does induce such action or forbearance is
binding if injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the
promise. The remedy granted for breach may be limited as justice
requires.
12

rights accordingly, but in equity and good conscience they have
upheld the bargain under the option and have reasonably relied on
such; consequently, the intent of the parties will not be
frustrated if the Petitioner regains fair rental value of his
property subject to the Jensen's legal option to purchase.
CONCLUSION
In conjunction with the test set forth in Russell and the
doctrines of reliance and equity, the Respondents respectfully
request the Court to hold that the lease contract and the Option
Contract are separate and independent, thus upholding the
factually based decision of the trial court.
Respectfully subrnpLt^pd this ( K 1 /7 day of August, 1988.
Frederick A (Jackman, #1632
Attorney for^che Defendants/Respondents
1327 South 800 East, Suite 300
Orem, Utah 84058
(801) 225-1632
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Addendum "A":

Lease Agreement

•THIS IS A LEGALLY BINDING CONTRACT IF NOT UNDERSTOOD. SEEK COMPETENT ADVICE."

Jleas*
J . DESMOND BESS • n d j a m T O ^

^^^f}jp^
P.O. Box 134
_, County of ........ Lale, ^^ii^J62^1^
harainafUr rafarrad to aa landlord, haraby remise, release and lat to ...JffiH*MLl..... JJJSS.8]lJlMJE«JXKJA JENSEN
of ..MP.?i..J?.92Li.?.?,i
H9Y.9
County of
.U.t«Jb
State of Utah,
hereinafter rafarrad to aa tenant, all thoaa pramiaaa situate, lying and baing in tha
™Utah
,~—~...............
_.ij...u.LiiniiM,iiiil. •••••• i . .I., i - - - of , LU..,., ,.,„•„,„„ ............... County of
and Stata of Utah, commonly known aa ._.__«»._....
(See Exhibit "A" ATTACHED HERETO AND
and mora particularly described aa followa, to wit: ,
INCORPORATED HEREIN)

(Lagal Daacription)
TO HAVE AND TO HOLD tha aaid pramiaaa, togathar with tha appurtanancaa, unto thatenant,from tha .!&£
day of
*Plii.
A.D. 1*J?JL, for and during and until tha ..!$*!>.
day of
AprU
AJ).

19 **8 a term of three years unless terminated by Lessee's purchase of said premises
under"'an Op tion'*aate3 "AprlTTTlWS".*
And Unant covenant* and agraaa to pay to landlord aa rantal for aaid pramiaaa, tha sum * F .

continuing on the fIrst day of each month thereafter durinOt the term hereof ._^
And tenant further agrees to deliver up aaid pramiaaa to landlord at the expiration of aaid term in ai good order
and condition ai when the aame were entered upon by tenant, raaaonabla uae and waar thereof and damage by the
elements excepted, and the tenant will not let or underlet aaid premises, or any part thereof without the written
conaant of landlord fint had and obtained, which consent will not be unreasonably withheld.
And tenant further convenanta and agrees that if aaid rent above reserved or any part thereof shall be unpaid
for
?.?.n.
days after the same shall beeome due; or if default in any of tha covenants herein contained to be
kept by tenant is not cured within . f i v e , days from written notice, or if tenant shall vacate such pramiaaa.
landlord may elect, without notice or lagal process, to re-enter and take possession of aaid premiaes and every and
any part thereof and re-let the same and apply the net proceeds so received upon the amount due or to become
due under this lease, and tenant agraaa to pay any deficiency.
Responsibility for the maintenance shall be aa indicated: Tenant responsible (T), Landlord responsible for (L).
Roof......!
, Exterior Walla....1
Interior Walla^.JT—, Structural Repair....!—, Interior Decorating—I—,
Exterior Painting...!—, Yard Surfacing™-!—, Plumbing Equipment....!—, Heating and Air Conditioning EquipT
T _, Light Globes and Tubes,..!..—, Glass Breakage...! , Trash Removals?-.
ment
„.., Electrical Equipment.?-.
Snow Removal...!—, Janitor..._L., Others
LakeBotton I r r i g a t i o n Co.
Responsibility for utilities, taxes and insurance shall be as indicated: Tenant responsible for (T), Landlord responsible for (L).
Power...
., HentJL , Water..
»Telephone .
~, Real Property tax...*:
, Incrosso
above 19.§-3.~ in Real Property Tax
, Personal Property Tax.—£_., Fire Insurance) on Building
k~, Firs
Insurance on Personal Property ! , Glass Insuranra I^. n Other
Each party shall be responsible for losses resulting from negligence or misconduct of himself, his employees
or invitees.
Furniture, fixtures and personal property of tenant may not be removed from the pramiaaa until rent and other
charges are fully paid.
In case of failure to faithfully perform the terms and covenants herein set forth, the defaulting party shall pay
ail costs, expenaes, and raaaonabla attorneys tmt resulting from the enforcement of thia agreement or any right
arising out of such breach.
.If.P.a.at..s.!x^
a<

;^^vcrBajL Campus Credit Union In Provo^ Utah

Witness the hands and seals of aaid landlord.-?
and aaid tenant 8 .— at.
thia ...JS.th.
day of
tt*I£h
AJD. I9...E5

P r o v o , Utah

Signed in presence of
^ • ^ ( S - . ,

RoiMld L. .lentifni

co^u^^

Patrlcti'i Jensen

S4AMK * • . •••— A

O •»« »r«. <• - »••• ••• •••» **•» - • • " ***** c , T f

EXHIBIT "A"
DESCRIPTION:
PARCEL 1: Commencing 25.39 chains North and 7.63 chains Vest of the Southeast coner
of the Southwest quarter of Section 34, Tovnshlp 6 South, Range 2 Eaat, Salt Lake Base
and Meridian; thence South 102.8 feet; thence East 168.77 feet; thence North 30* 20'
Vest 38.74 feet; thence East 429 feet to the Vest line of the Road; thence Worth 39* 35*
Vest 90 feet along said road; thence Vest 534 feet to the place of beginning.
PARCEL 2: Commencing 25.39 chains North and 7.63 chains Vest and South 102.8 feet of
the Southeast corner of the Southwest Quarter of Section 34, Tovnshlp 6 South, Range 2
East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian; thence East 168.77 feet; thence South 30* 20' East
488.02 feet; thence Vest 430.6 feet; thence North 421.20 feet to the place of beginning.
Together with 1/2 share of Lake Bottom Irrigation Water.

Addendum "B": Option Contract

-THIS IS A LCGAUY IINDING CONTtACT. IF NOT UNOfHSTOOD. StIK COMPtUNT ADVICE."

OPTION
:NOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS:
Jv.DB^ij^
Tnll
f ?.;..°! J ? * J.?*^J-.**e..t...!***?** .?^.7.9.?rPA.?*
.deration of T ^ . ™ ? y $ ^ P « J ^

aid by ..JMM&O^

f

*£? J l t JJox J 2 ^

v.

_
hereinafter referred lo as "Seller, hereby agrees for and in con(%~l*.59.9.2.99
) Dollara,

I1ZZZZI

hereinafter referred to as "Buyer, aa follows:

1. PROPERTY: Seller hereby gives and grants to Buyer and to his heirs and assigns for a period of ...fL.. months from
te date hereof, hereinafter referred to as T i n t Option Period", the exclusive right and privilege of purchasing the follow*
if described real property located at JL£j:J!.JkjLJ&*.J*!t*i~J&9X9..
, County of
K£*!?
. State of
y.£a!?. ;
— and more particularly described
t follows:
(SEE EXHIBIT "A" APPEARING ON THE REVERSE SIDE HEREOF, INCORPORATED HEREIN
FOR DESCRIPTION)
Together with 1/2 share of Lake Bottom Irrigation Co., Water Stock.

ogether with all water rights appurtenant thereto or used in connection therewith.
Said real property and Improvements, if any, ahall hereinafter be referred to as "The Property**).
2. PRICE. The total purchase price for said property Is . . J ! i ! ? J ! ! ^ ^
i-.8O.1PO.Q4.OQ
) Dollars, payable In lawful money of the United States, strictly within the following times, to-wlt All
ims paid for this option and any extension thereof aa herein provided, shall be first applied on the purchase price, and the
ilance ahall be paid as follows:
T o t a l down payment i n c l u d i n g funds paid hereunder t o be $ 1 5 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 .
luyer t o assume e x i s t i n g l o a n from Real e s t a t e Contract dated June 3 0 , 1 9 7 8 , by and between
Jtephen William Neal and Barbara Ann N e a l , a s S e l l e r and J . Desmond.Bess and K r l s t i n e B e s s ,
Buyers in accordance, with the terms thereof. Balance of S e l l e r ' s equity to be paid together
h i n t e r e s t thereon at the rate of 11.5 Z per annum in equal annual installments including
xrtCipal and i n t e r e s t in the amount of $3,000.00, with f i r s t installment due one year a f t e r
x e r c i s e of option and annually thereafter u n t i l s e l l e r s equity i s paid in f u l l .
3. EXTENSION OF OPTION. Upon payment by Buyer to Seller of an additional sum of „™PlTS5V^D_FIVE—
tUHDRED ANDNO/100 - - - - - - - - - - - , - <$JL5.Q.(L0&
) Dollars, cash or by cashier's
ieck, prior to the expiration of the first option period, this option shsll be extended for
JBix —..... months, hereinter referred to as "Second Option Period". Upon Buyer's payment to Seller of a further aum of ^TJ,!9.rIH91!SAJ!S.JE.?.il.^
^ M f t j ^ - ^
$....2,500*00
) Dollars, prior to the explra>n of the second option period, this option shall be extended for a third period of
S3JL
_ additional months,
•reinafter referred to as 'Third Option Period".. Upon Buyer*8 payment to Seller of a further sum of
W0-TH0USAND FIVE HUNDRED AND N0/00 t$2,500.00) Dollars, prior to the expiration of the third
ption period, this option shall be extended for a fourth period of 6ix additidnal months,
ereinalter .referred as "Fourth Option Period", Upon Buyer's payment to Seller of a further
urn of TWO-THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED AND NO/100 ($2,500.00) Dollars, prior to the expiration of
he Fourth Option period, this option shall be extended for a fifth period of (SEE BELOW *)

4. EXERCISE OF OPTION. This option shall be exercised by written notice to Seller on or before the expiration of
e first option period, or If extended, the expiration of the second or third option periods as the case may be. Notice to
erciae this option or to extend the option for the addltlonaloption period, whether personally delivered or mailed to
Her at his address as Indicated after Seller's signature hereto, by registered or certified mall, postage prepaid, and postarked on or before such date of explratlon./ahall be timely and shall be deemed actual notice to Seller.
or within 10 days thereafter
*. EVIDENCE OF TITLE.
(a) Promptly after the execution of this option, Seller shall deliver to Buyer for examination such abstracts of title,
le policies, and other evidences of title as the Seller may have. In the event this option is not exercised by Buyer, all
ch evidences of title shsll be Immediately returned without expense to Seller.
(b) In the event this option Is exercised as herein provided. Seller agrees to pay all abstracting expense or at Seller's
tion to furnish a policy of title insurance in the name of the Buyer.
(c) If an examination of the title should reveal defects in the title. Buyer shall notify Seller In writing thereof,
d Seller agrees to forthwith take all reasonable action to clear the title. If the Seller does not clear title within a reaeonle time, Buyer may do so at Seller's expense. Seller agrees to make final conveyance by Warranty Deed or
M
.^.«..^
_
^. In the event of sale of other than real property. If either party fails to perform
i provisions of this agreement, the party at fault agrees to pay sll costs of enforcing this agreement, or any right arising
t of the breach thereof, including a reasonable Attorney's fee.
six additional months, hereinafter referred to as "Fifth Option period". Upon Buyer's
payment to Seller of a further sum of TWO-THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED AND NO/100 ($2,500.00)
Dollars, prior to the expiration of the Fifth option period, this option shall be extended
for a sixth period of six addition monUis hcrelnaltcr referred to ay "NiMh Opt inn Period".
Buyer shall h.-ivis a 10 day Rrace period after expiration dare of each option to maker
payment.'; Ui c.:LuJ the option lor t,uli option period.

I. CLOSING ADJUSTMENTS. All risk of loss and destruction of property *intl exix-nsc* or insurance shjll be borne by
Jer until date of position. At time of doting of sale, pro|»erty taxes, rents, insurance, Interest and other expenses of
operty shall be ptorated a* of date of possession. All other taxes, Including documentary taxes, and all assessments,
ortgage liens and other Hens, encumbrances or chaiges against the property of any nature, shall be paid by Seller except
as required by Buyer^under^jexisting> l e a s e as a tenant. **
_
7. POSSESSION. Seller agrees to surrender possession of the property KX&iptiWttHXX
~. _ . JUi& following
M
ritten notice of the exercising of this option by Buyer., and c l o s i n g of s a l e through Escrow * at Security
T i t l e and Abstract Company.
$. The Seller recognises
J49Jte
N/A.
Heal Estate Company
Iroker and Agent) through its salesman ..
None
.~
«...
,.,
.
the Real Estate Broker with whom Seller listed this property for sale, and Seller agrees to pay a commission to said
No e
-oker equal to . ?. ... %• of the gross sale price, and Seller hereby authoi izes the ageni to withhold such commission from
t proceeds of sale at time of closing.
or within ten days thereafter
t. If this option be not exercised on or before the dates specified herein/for exercise of same, the option shall expire
its own force and effect and the Seller may retain such option monies as have been paid to the Seller as full consideration
r the granting of this option.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the Seller hereunto has set his name this A?.'
day of
AElii
__*
—£$.•- ** Any insurance funds paid to S e l l e r for damage, l o s s , or destruction of dwelling
• h a l l be used to replace or repair said dwelling to original condition.
CNED IN PRESENCE OF;

^^g^SS^

Kristine Bess
Address of Seller.
Laic, Hawaii

Seller
!!.!&•• JfflSJ^JL
96762-0134
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EXHIBIT "A"
DESCRIPTION:
PARCEL 1: Commencing 25.39 chains North and 7.63 chains Vest of the Southeast coner
of the Southwest quarter of Section 34, Township 6 South, Range 2 East, Salt Lake Base
and Meridian; thence South 102.8 feet; thence East 168.77 feet; thence North 30* 20 1
West 38.74 feet; thence East 429 feet to the West line of the Road; thence Nprth 39* 35'
West 90 feet along said road; thence West 534 feet to the place of beginning.
PARCEL 2: Commencing 25.39 chains North and 7.63 chains West and South 102.8 feet of
the Southeast corner of the Southwest Quarter of Section 34, Township 6 South, Range 2
East, Salt lake Base and Meridian; thence East 168,77 feet; thence South 30* 20* East
488.02 feet; thence West 430.6 feet; thence North 421.20 feet to the place of beginning.
Together with 1/2 share of Lake Bottom Irrigation Water.

APPROVED:

March 20, 1985

Addendum "C": Decision of Judge Ballif dated
January 28, 1988
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
*******

J. DESMOND BESS and
KRISTINE BESS,

Case Number

CV 87 1258

Plaintiffs,
vs.

DECISION

RONALD L. JENSEN and
PATRICIA JENSEN,
Defendants.
********

This matter came before the court for trial on the 1st
day

of

December,

1987, Orson

B. West, Jr. appearing

for

the

plaintiffs and Frederick A. Jackman appearing for the defendants.
The parties filed with the court a written stipulation
of fact augmented by oral proffers, argued the case and submitted
it to the court for decision.
The court having fully considered the matter now enters
its:
DECISION
In
pertain

this

matter

to termination

the court

of the lease

finds

the

(attached

issues

as

they

to complaint as

Exhibit A) in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant
and finds that the lease payments as provided in said lease are
delinquent

from

and

after

the month

of May,

1987, until

the

present-time.

The same having been due and payable on the first

day of each month, and delinquent from and after the 10th day of
each month.
Pursuant to the stipulated facts and proffers made, the
court further finds that the plaintiffs served a notice to quit
upon the defendants by personal service on Patricia Jensen, one
of

the

co-tenants, on May

21,

1907, which

notice

sought

the

payment of one month's rent which plaintiffs had declined on the
12th day of May, 1987, or that suit for treble damages would be
commenced.

This notice was ineffective as to the treble damage

for unlawful detainer

in that plaintiff had already refused the

cash tender of the delinquent payment for the month of May.
Based
defendants

on

the

dated March

letters

of

9 and April 10

plaintiff's

counsel

to

(Exhibits no. 3 and 5)

concerning past delinquencies and future strict compliance with
the lease provisions as to payment, it is clear that the intent
of Exhibit #6 was to get the defendants out of possession of the
property, and that the letter of Universal Campus Credit dated
May 14, 1987, (Exhibit No. 7) and the notice in Exhibit No. 6 to
deliver up possession was sufficient notice to defendants' that
the lease was considered terminated by the plaintiffs due to the
May delinquency.

Any confusion created by the service of Exhibit

No. 6 and defendants failure to respond thereto, was put to rest
when plaintiff filed this action to terminate the lease on May

29,

1987, and

served

summons

and complaint

on June

4, 1987.

Pingres v. Continental Group of Utah, Inc., 558 P.2d 1317 (1976).
See also Johnson v. Austin, 73 Utah Adv. Rep. 40.
The plaintiff is entitled to a termination of the lease
and the receipt of all payments tendered, plus interest, in the
amount of the monthly rental from May 12, 1987, to the present
time.

The court finds that the lease payments are the reasonable

rental

value

of

the

premises

for

the

period

of

defendant's

occupancy from and after May of 1987.
Plaintiff

is

also

entitled

to

attorney's

fees

for

forfeit

the

prosecuting the termination of the lease agreement.
As

to

the

payments made under

claims

of

the

plaintiff

to

the option agreement, the court finds the

issues against the plaintiff and in favor of the defendant, that
said option agreement is still viable and that all payments made
thereunder
obligations

have

been

imposed

consistent

and

in

accordance

with

upon the defendant to pay pursuant

the

to the

option agreement, and upon the defendant counterclaimants making
all

of the additional

required

payments

thereunder, and

their

assumption of the loan from the real estate contract dated June
30,

J978,

between

NeaJ

as

selJcrs

and

Boss

as

buyers,

the

defendants will be entitled to possession of the property and a
quit claim deed from the plaintiff conveying all of their right,
title and interest in the subject property to Jensens.

The defendants are entitled

to their

attorney's fees

against the plaintiff for defending their rights pursuant to the
option contract.

The court considers that the attorney fees and

costs cancel, so that each party will bear their own.
Counsel

are directed

to prepare

appropriate

findings

consistent with rulings in their favor herein, and submit same to
the court for signing and entry as one judgment and decree in
this matter.
DATED at Provo, Utah, this 2, Y

day of January, 1988.

GEORGE C. BALtlF, JUDGE

Addendum "D": Judgment and Order dated April 6, 1988

is:d

- .
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FREDERICK A. JACKMAN, #1632
Artorney for Defendant
1327 South 800 East, Suite 300
Orem, Utah 84058
(801) 225-1632
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
J. DESMOND BESS and
KRISTINE BESS,
JUDGMENT AND ORDER

^

Plaintiffs,

RONALD L. JENSEN and
PATRICIA JENSEN,

JUDGE BALLIF
Civil No. CV87-1258

Defendants
This matter came before the Court for trial on the 1st day
of

December,

1987,

Orson

B.

West,

Jr.,

appearing

for

the

plaintiffs and Frederick A. Jackman appearing for the defendants.
The parties filed with the Court a written Stipulation of fact
augmented by oral proffers, argued the case and submitted it to
the Court for its decision.
its

Findings

of

Fact

and

The Court having heretofore entered
Conclusions

of

Law,

and

good

cause

appearing therefor, it is hereby
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED:
1.

The defendants failed to make lease payments as provided

in the Lease Agreement.

2.

The defendants are delinquent in their lease payments

from May, 1987, until the present time.
3.

Lease payments have been due and payable on the 1st day

of each month and are delinquent from and after the 10th day of
each month.
4.

The plaintiffs are not entitled to treble damages.

5.

Plaintiffs are entitled to termination of the Lease and

the receipt of all payments tendered plus interest in the amount
of the monthly rental from May 12, 1987, to the present time.
6.

The lease payments are the reasonable rental value of

the premises for the period of defendantsf

occupancy

from and

after May of 1987.
7.

Plaintiffs

are

entitled

to

attorney's

fees

for

that

all

prosecuting the termination of the lease.
8.

The

Option

Agreement

is

still

viable

and

payments thereunder have been consistent and in accordance with
the obligations imposed upon the defendant to pay pursuant to the
Option Agreement.
9.
required

That upon the defendants' making all of the additional
payments

pursuant

to

the Option

Agreement

and

their

assumption of the loan from the Real Estate Contract dated June
30,

1978, between Neal as "Sellers" and Bess as "Buyers", the

defendants will be entitled to possession of the property and a
2

Quit-Claim

Deed

to the defendant

from the plaintiff

conveying

all of their right, title and interest in the subject property to
the defendants.
10.

The defendants are entitled to their attorney's

fees

against the plaintiffs for defending their rights pursuant to the
Option Agreement.
11.
cancelled

The
so

Court
that

considers

each

party

the
will

attorney's
bear

their

attorney's fees.
DATED this

£

day o f ^ s t < 1988.

GEORGE <gf. BALLIF
D i s t r i c t Court Judg

APPROVED AS TO FORM:

n

Q 7

/?

ORSON B. WEST
^
Attorney for Plaintiffs

3

fees
own

and

costs

costs

and

Addendum "E": Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
dated April 6, 1988

CS3AFR -G M

FREDERICK A. JACKMAN, #1632
Attorney for Defendant
1327 South 800 East, Suite 300
Orem, Utah 84058
(801) 225-1632
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
J. DESMOND BESS and
KRISTINE BESS,
FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Plaintiffs,
v.
RONALD L. JENSEN and
PATRICIA JENSEN,

JUDGE BALLIF
Civil No. CV87-1258

Defendants
This matter came before the Court for trial on the 1st day
of

December,

1987,

Orson

B.

West,

Jr.,

appearing

for

the

plaintiffs and Frederick A. Jackman appearing for the defendants.
The parties filed with the Court a written Stipulation of fact
augmented by oral proffers, argued the case and submitted it to
the Court for its decision.

The Court having fully considered

the matter, now enters its:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

The defendants•failed to make lease payments as provided

in the Lease Agreement.
2.

The defendants are delinquent in their lease payments
1

from May, 1987, until the present time.
3.

Lease payments have been due and payable on the 1st day

of each month and are delinquent from and after the 10th day of
each month.
4.

The plaintiffs are not entitled to treble damages.

5.

Plaintiffs are entitled to termination of the Lease and

the receipt of all payments tendered plus interest in the amount
of the monthly rental from May 12, 1987, to the present time.
6.

The

reasonable

Court

rental

finds

value

that

of

the

the

lease

premises

payments
for

the

are

the

period

of

fees

for

defendants' occupancy from and after May of 1987.
7.

Plaintiffs

are

entitled

to

attorney's

prosecuting the termination of the lease.
8.

The

Court

finds

that

the Option Agreement

is

still

viable and that all payments thereunder have been consistent and
in accordance with the obligations imposed upon the defendant to
pay pursuant to the Option Agreement.
9.
required

That upon the defendants' making all of the additional
payments

pursuant

to

the

Option

Agreement

and

their

assumption of the loan from the Real Estate Contract dated June
30,

1978, between Neal as "Sellers" and Bess as "Buyers", the

defendants will be entitled to possession of the property and a
Quit-Claim

Deed

to the defendant

2

from the plaintiff

conveying

all of their right, title and interest in the subject property to
the defendants.
10.

The defendants are entitled to their attorney's fees

against the plaintiffs for defending their rights pursuant to the
Option Agreement.
11.
cancelled

The
so

Court
that

considers

each

party

the
will

attorney's
bear

their

fees
own

and

costs

costs

and

attorney's fees.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

Defendants breached the Lease Agreement and the Lease is

hereby terminated.
2.

The plaintiffs are entitled to judgment in the amount of

$462.47 per month commencing from May, 1987, to the present, with
interest at the rate of 10% per annum thereon.
3.

Plaintiffs

are entitled to attorney's

fees and Court

costs.
4.

The Option Agreement

is still viable

as between the

parties and all payments made thereunder have been consistent and
in accordance with the obligation imposed upon the defendants to
pay pursuant to the Option Agreement.
5.

That upon the defendants' making all of the additional

required payments thereunder, and their assumption of the loan
from the Real Estate Contract dated June 30, 1978, between Neal

3

as "Sellers" and Bess as "Buyers", the plaintiff shall convey the
property by Quit-Claim Deed to the defendants and at that time
the defendants will be entitled to possession of the properties.
6.

The defendants

against the plaintiff

are entitled

to their attorney's

and such attorney's fees shall

fees

act as a

set-off as against the attorney's fees awarded to the plaintiff
and therefore, the attorney's fees cancel so that each party will
bear their own costs and attorney's fees.
DATED this

&"

day of ftg^feW*/1988,

^GEORGE E. (bALLIF
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
APPROVED AS TO FORM:

ORSON B. WEST
Attorney for Plaintiffs

4

^

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that 4 true and correct copies of the
foregoing RESPONDENT'S BRIEF were mailed, postage prepaid, on the
day of August, 1988, to the following:
Bradley R. Jones, #A4747
Attorney at Law
302 West 5400 South, Suite 103
Murray, Utah 84107
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